Overthrowing Governments for Amateurs

The CIA and Access to Oil in the Middle East

“The Interests of the U.K. and U.S. in the Middle East:

“1. Oil. The United States has important interests in Middle Eastern oil. To the United Kingdom the freedom to develop Middle Eastern oil resources is vital.

“2. Communications. The free use of the Suez Canal and air routes across the Middle East is a vital interest for the West.

“3. Defense. The physical defense of the area is necessary to protect these interests and deny them to the Soviet Union. If she could successfully penetrate the Middle East, Africa would lie open to her.”

-Top Secret U.S. government document from the Eveland papers, 1950s

“Of paramount interest to the UK in the Middle East is its oil. The principal requirement and the sole reason for UK interest in the Middle East is its oil. If the British could be assured of a supply of oil from the area for the next 60 years it would have no other interest in the Middle East. It is recognised that the cooperation of the people in the area is essential in order that the oil may be obtained and so in the search for other objectives we must not lose sight of this oil requirement.”

-Top Secret U.S. government document from the Eveland papers, US-UK Discussions of the Middle East Situation, January 13, 1956

While working undercover for the CIA in the late 1950s, Wilbur “Bill” Eveland learned important lessons in how corruption could threaten to create an international crisis. He heard that members of the U.S. Navy would visit Lebanon for shore leave, but that they were officially barred from the red-light district, given the risk and prevalence of venereal disease. Handing sailors from the Sixth Fleet a map highlighting the forbidden zones was, in Eveland’s view, like waving a red flag near a bull. During a raid on a brothel by shore patrol units in conjunction with Lebanese gendarmes, a U.S. sailor fled through a window and collided into a Lebanese man on the street, knocking him over and breaking his leg. The sailor fled and was never identified. The injured man happened to belong to a politically influential group and the Lebanese foreign ministry demanded that the U.S. compensate him for his injuries and lost wages.

Eveland’s associate had already paid his medical bills but now he needed to calculate an additional amount for six weeks of lost income for a pimp who managed five young prostitutes. Eveland gave him the going rate for cabaret girls but this was of no use; they instead had to calculate the rate of “‘tricks’ per hour, not per night.” They eventually settled on an exchange: a 1954 Ford car to be imported to Lebanon. As the transaction was being processed, Eveland cursed his CIA colleagues for not allowing him to keep his State Department diplomatic passport, which would have made him immune from local laws, including the import duties he now had to pay on the car. His lack of diplomatic immunity would have much more serious consequences for him professionally and personally later.

Grammar

Eveland had a front row seat to the forming of U.S. Middle East policy during his career in the U.S. government. Originally from Spokane, Washington, Eveland joined the U.S. Army in 1940 and was recruited in 1941 into the Corps of Intelligence Police, later the Counter Intelligence Corps, where he held senior field and intelligence posts, including leadership of CIC offices in Panama, until 1948. Preparing for a diplomatic intelligence role, Eveland studied Arabic for a year at the Army Language School and served at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad from 1950 to 1952. He later became the Army’s Near East intelligence specialist. Despite his years of experience, once he started working with the CIA in the early 1950s, he realized he still had much to learn.

Being privy to discussions at high levels of U.S. government decision making was eye-opening for Eveland. When Ambassador Jefferson Caffery reported that Egypt had declined U.S. military aid in favor of increased economic assistance, the CIA challenged this account, arguing that true negotiations were being conducted directly with Gamal Abdel Nasser through CIA channels. The Agency proposed a covert scheme to funnel military assistance to Egypt through unattributed funds disguised as economic aid, bypassing both legal and diplomatic constraints. Tasked with advising the Secretary of Defense, Eveland opposed the CIA plan: “I recommended that we oppose it as contrary to law,” he remembered. He warned that the small, covert sums proposed would likely anger rather than satisfy Nasser once Egypt’s larger arms needs became clear. His recommendation was overruled and the CIA prevailed in the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), a committee set up by President Eisenhower to oversee covert operations. The Pentagon was ordered to send two officers, secretly and under CIA arrangements, to meet Nasser, Eveland among them. Eveland expressed deep unease at the CIA’s growing role in conducting what amounted to U.S. diplomacy, which he raised with Assistant Secretary Henry Byroade: “When I asked Byroade if the Dulles brothers might not between them be making and implementing some aspects of American foreign policy, I was not reassured when he only laughed.”

Unexpectedly appointed from the Army General Staff to a senior policy role in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Eveland became chief of Middle East policy planning within the Office of Foreign Military Affairs. In this role, Eveland familiarized himself with two key National Security Council (NSC) documents. After reviewing the first, NSC 5428 on U.S. policy in the Middle East, he dismissed it as largely being rhetorical; it endorsed Arab-Israeli peace efforts, support for the “northern tier” states, and the protection of Western interests, but it lacked concrete plans. The second, NSC 5401 on denial of petroleum resources, troubled him deeply and the document remains classified to this day. It had been approved by the President on January 2, 1954 and outlined active plans for the military and CIA to destroy Middle Eastern oil fields to prevent their use by a Soviet invasion. Eveland believed that Western oil companies were almost certainly aware of this policy, given their necessary cooperation, but doubted that the oil-producing states themselves knew their resources might be deliberately destroyed. He feared the potential consequences of this policy: if U.S. acted and the anticipated Soviet attack never came, the destruction of Arab oil resources could drive regional governments to welcome the Soviets and leave the United States unable to justify or recover from the damage it had caused.

Expanding military aid to Iran, Eveland believed, was an entirely different matter. In preparation for an impending NSC decision, he spent weeks immersed in reports from American officials in Tehran. At the time, Iran hosted two U.S. military missions: one responsible for maintaining internal security, the other theoretically tasked with enabling Iran’s armed forces to resist a Soviet invasion long enough for Western reinforcements to arrive. In parallel, after assisting the Shah’s return to power, the CIA was channeling covert funds into a massive expansion of Iran’s intelligence service and secret police, SAVAK, designed to secure the Shah’s rule. The CIA Station Chief in Beirut, Ghosn Zogby, later informed Eveland that the coup in Iran that brought the Shah back to power had been engineered by the Agency’s Kim Roosevelt at a cost of “a mere $10,000 and six or seven career CIA agents.”

Despite Iran’s economic fragility and internal instability, the State Department recommended substantial increases in deliveries of tanks, artillery, aircraft, and other heavy weapons to the country. Eveland, representing the Department of Defense, was looking to articulate a contrary position grounded in Joint Chiefs of Staff assessments: that U.S. funding should prioritize internal security rather than sophisticated military hardware.

Eveland apprehensively sat next to General Charles Bonesteel, Defense’s representative on the Planning Board. Chairing the meeting was Robert Cutler, President Eisenhower’s national security advisor. Eveland studied the faces around the room and spotted CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Amory, his assistant William Bundy, as well as Richard Bissell, an assistant deputy director from the Agency’s clandestine services. They were there, Eveland presumed, to ensure that the intelligence community’s formal assessment of Iran did not undermine their case for directly financing the Shah and SAVAK.

Position papers from each department and agency were circulated. Cutler reviewed them one by one, invited discussion where disagreements arose, or simply selected the paper most consistent with the President’s views and declared it official policy. Eveland was disappointed that the paper he had drafted was on the bottom of the stack. When Cutler reached Eveland’s paper, he picked up a red pencil, shook his head, and circled a passage. Cutler demanded: “Who wrote this thing?” Bonesteel replied: “Major Eveland, sir; he’s sitting here with me.” Holding the red pencil and peering over his glasses, the President’s national security adviser turned directly to Eveland. “Major,” he said, “what in hell do you mean by ‘the Iranian army’s inability to intelligently and effectively absorb and employ sophisticated military equipment’? That’s wrong, doubly wrong! Don’t you know that?”

Reaching into his briefcase, Eveland took out a report from the U.S. Army mission in Iran, signed by the commanding major general. He began reading aloud, describing how a shipment of olive-drab paint, delivered in drums months earlier, had been mistaken for lubricating oil by Iranian tank crews responsible for maintaining one hundred new Sherman tanks. They had poured the paint into the engines’ crankcases, disabling them completely. Henry Byroade burst out laughing at the anecdote, despite the fact that his own paper had cited the U.S. ambassador’s assurances of Iran’s readiness against a Soviet attack. “And, sir,” Eveland added, “I’ve many more examples here to cite.” Cutler had another, much less substantive, aspect in mind with his criticism. “You miss the point, Eveland,” Cutler snapped. “Your paper not only splits an infinitive; it does so twice! Clean up your grammar and send the paper back to me. I agree entirely that the Iranians are far from ready for more heavy equipment, and I’ll send your corrected work to the President and the NSC for final approval as U.S. policy.” Cutler smiled at Eveland and brought the meeting to a close.

Overthrowing the Middle East

In meetings with Evelyn Shuckburgh, the British Assistant Under-Secretary in charge of Middle East affairs, and his team, Eveland took careful notes for CIA Director Allen Dulles. Shuckburgh wanted to discuss Saudi Arabia and what could be done to “bring about a fundamental change in the government of Saudi Arabia.” To Eveland, “that sounded as if the British wanted a coup to eliminate the Saudi monarchy and planned to try this with or without the help of the CIA.” Shuckburgh’s stance was euphemistically referenced in a State Department memo in January 1956: “His solution is a tough policy against Saudi Arabia in which the British hope very much we will join.”

A flight with Shuckburgh proved largely unproductive in Eveland’s view. When Eveland voiced his concern that Iraq might attempt to take over Syria, either through a coup or by military force, Shuckburgh responded angrily: “Perhaps you’d prefer to have the CIA’s Nasser in control of Syria instead.” Eveland suggested that it might be better to allow the Syrians to determine their own course instead of having the Egyptian leader take them over, but Shuckburgh dismissed this as impossible. In Shuckburgh’s view, Nasser sought to dominate Syria and was acting as a Russian proxy in the region. Becoming increasingly drunk via the cocktails on the plane, Shuckburgh claimed that U.S. funds sent to King Saud were indirectly supporting Nasser’s ambitions in Syria. Shuckburgh added a final observation, as Eveland paraphrased: “someday America might wake up and realize that Iraq represented the salvation of the West in the Middle East.”

Eveland became familiar with some of the CIA’s operations in the Middle East, including how they referenced them internally. Cryptonyms that began with “WA” were for projects related to Syria, “CU” for Iraq, “SI” referred to Egypt, “PE” for Lebanon, and “NO” was reserved for Jordan. Eveland did not realize at the time how significant the project to strengthen King Hussein of Jordan would become. King Hussein was designated “NORMAN” and the program providing him with direct financial support was code-named “NOBEEF” by Kim Roosevelt. This cryptonym concealed multimillion-dollar payments to the king for years until it was exposed by the press in 1977, by which point the payments had been occurring for 20 years: “They were usually delivered in cash to the king by the CIA station chief in Amman,” the Washington Post reported.

In late March 1956 while in Beirut, Eveland received a cable directing him to proceed to London. CIA officer Jim Eichelberger flew from Cairo to meet him there for what Eveland expected would be difficult discussions with the British government about Middle Eastern affairs. Eveland learned through reading press reports on the flight over that the Egyptians and Saudis were seeking to drive Britain from the Middle East entirely. When Eichelberger explained that their meetings would be with Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Eveland joked that perhaps they were being invited to assist in eliminating Nasser. Eichelberger replied in a serious tone: “If our British cousins had their way, that would be just the plan.” These were to be exploratory talks with MI6 from the CIA’s perspective; any decisions were to be delayed until Allen Dulles and Kim Roosevelt arrived there early the next week.

Eveland then asked whether this meant he would be openly identified as a CIA specialist, abandoning his OCB cover. “Of course,” Jim replied, “the British already know your true status.” Eveland was displeased, although there was nothing he could about it. Eichelberger reassured him that liaison between the CIA and SIS was “completely frank and quite secure.” Eveland was interested in gaining firsthand insight into how the much-praised British intelligence service functioned.

Taking the London Underground, they got off at St. James Park Station to approach a block of unremarkable offices known as the Broadway Buildings, headquarters of MI6. After passing through the lobby of the main building, they crossed an alley to a second entrance, where an antiquated elevator took them to the top floor. Eveland and Eichelberger entered a small room with water-damaged walls to find six men seated around a long conference table. The men were wearing rumpled English suits and none of them looked like a typical movie spy: “There wasn’t a James Bond type in the bunch.” To Eveland, they most closely resembled ordinary clerks, rather than the elite Oxbridge graduates as they were known to be by reputation.

The meeting was led by George Kennedy Young, deputy director under Major General Sir John Sinclair, the MI6 chief. Young, a large and formidable figure, stated bluntly that the gathering reflected a shift in British Middle East policy. According to him, the new approach had been communicated and approved by both U.K. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Recalling earlier discussions in Washington and British hints that regime change might be necessary in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Eveland wondered whether the Foreign Office had abandoned hope of a diplomatic solution and given Young and his colleagues carte blanche. Eichelberger clarified to Young that their role was limited to gathering facts and that they were not authorized to commit to any plans on behalf of the U.S. government. Young brushed this aside impatiently, suggesting that the Americans were simply unaware of agreements already reached between Lloyd and Dulles.

Young then laid out the British view: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria posed a threat to Britain’s survival and their governments would have to be undermined or removed. Iraq was the linchpin of British influence and regional stability, he explained, making it essential to bolster Prime Minister Nuri al-Said’s position swiftly and decisively. Turkey and Iran were regarded as allies who might assist British actions. Since Egypt’s Nasser could not be confronted immediately, priority had to be given to Syria, which Young stated was on the brink of becoming a Soviet satellite. British planners assumed that action in Syria would provoke Saudi hostility, necessitating the overthrow of King Saud next. After that, before Nasser could deploy Soviet bombers against Israel, he would have to be eliminated. Young warned that Jordan and Lebanon’s futures depended on rapid action in Syria and insisted that no more than a month could elapse before Syria’s government was overthrown.

Eveland listened in disbelief to all of this news as Young asserted that the initial Syrian operation could be carried out using British resources alone, with or without American approval. The United States could assist, Young suggested, by containing Saudi and Egyptian reactions until phases two and three removed King Saud and Nasser. For the moment, however, Britain would not disclose operational details regarding Syria. What it wanted immediately was Washington’s position on the entire British scheme, by cable and before Allen Dulles arrived. With that, the first meeting was over.

Returning to their hotel, Eveland and Eichelberger both agreed that the MI6 discussion had been “sheer lunacy.” They speculated it may have been an attempt by Young to provoke them into offering alternative CIA proposals. They decided to send no messages back to headquarters until they could obtain more concrete details of Britain’s plans.

The British became more hostile over the next three meetings. George Young was irritated that Eveland and Eichelberger were not sending daily cables back to Washington. Young denigrated Kim Roosevelt’s previous boasts of restoring the Shah of Iran to power: this had poisoned U.S.–Iranian relations, according to Young. Britain’s standing in Iran, Young insisted, was stronger than it had been in fifty years. Turning to Egypt, he declared that the United States had “created a monster” in Nasser, dismissed the intelligence the CIA shared on Egypt as “pure rubbish,” and demanded that the Americans either accept the MI6 assessment of the Egyptian leader or explicitly call out Britain’s reports as “phony.”

Eveland, having recently visited Damascus, pressed Young until he revealed details of the proposed Syrian coup. Turkey, Young said, would start by provoking border incidents. Iraq would then incite unrest among desert tribes and the Partie Populaire Syrienne in Lebanon would infiltrate across the frontier, until widespread disorder justified an Iraqi military intervention. These arrangements, Young claimed, had already been discussed with the parties expected to take part.

At the final meeting, Young asked Eveland to give his views of Britain’s plans. Eveland restrained himself from expressing his opinion that “total insanity had set in” and instead observed that Britain seemed to be relying almost entirely on Iraq to achieve its objectives in Syria and Saudi Arabia. With respect to Egypt, he expressed doubt that Iraq possessed any greater capability there than Britain itself and suggested that talk of unseating Nasser amounted to little more than wishful thinking. Young shook his head and replied that Eveland had overlooked one element: “the snipcocks.”

Eveland was completely confused by this remark until Eichelberger quietly explained that the term was Young’s slang for the Israelis, a slur dating back to Britain’s conflict with Zionist militants during the Palestine mandate. Young then smiled and handed them a summary of their discussions he wanted them to cable back to Allen Dulles, adding that he would stop by the next morning to examine what they planned to send. His reference to joint planning with Israel finally pushed Eveland and Eichelberger to send an urgent operational cable. Whether deliberate or not, if Young’s statement reflected actual British government thinking, it was something both of the Dulles brothers needed to know, as it suggested that prospects for a regional peace settlement were in serious jeopardy.

Eveland and Eichelberger went back to their hotel and drafted what they thought was an alarmist cable. The following morning, Young reviewed the draft and found it acceptable, but requested several additions, including: “Britain is now prepared to fight its last battle”; “no matter what the cost we will win”; the “situation in Syria has been discussed with Israel, but not in terms of getting their positive support”; and “we have to face the possibility that Nasser might close the canal, and would like to know how the U.S. would react to that.” Young indicated that their discussions would be taken up by the British cabinet; Eveland added this point before finally sending the cable.

Later over a bottle of White Label, Eveland and Eichelberger assessed what they had heard. Eichelberger was part of Kim Roosevelt’s CIA group that had attempted to create a “pro-Western Nasser.” Eveland was therefore not surprised when Eichelberger argued that there was “absolutely no evidence” that Nasser was a Soviet puppet. Eveland nonetheless found merit in Eichelberger’s view that the United States had not openly opposed Nasser’s policies and might be better served by countering them in ways that preserved the possibility of future negotiations, once Nasser realized the constraints attached to Soviet support.

After Eichelberger returned to Washington to be available for questioning, Eveland met after the weekend with Kim Roosevelt, who appeared irritated that the urgent cable had interrupted a tennis game at Allen Dulles’ home. There had been panic back in Washington given the contents of the memo; Kim Roosevelt explained that he was not angry but that he and Allen Dulles would now deal with the British government instead of Eveland, who he instructed to return to Syria. Eveland was in fact angry at this demotion, but kept his composure and was confident he would be vindicated in the end. He doubted that George Young and the British had merely been bluffing to get their attention.

Eveland observed through reading British press coverage and statements by Secretary of State Dulles that there were hints of unilateral military action, claims Eisenhower quickly denied. Having no access to the President himself, these developments led Eveland to suspect that a Dulles–Lloyd policy agreement existed and that the Dulles brothers might be shaping policy independently. Skeptical of plans to destabilize Syria or support a coup using Iraq, Eveland interpreted reports of tribal clashes along the Syrian–Iraqi border as manufactured “instability” meant to justify regime change. Reluctant to raise these concerns directly through CIA channels, he instead used an indirect method by subtly alerting journalist Sam Brewer, knowing that coverage in the New York Times would reach senior policymakers. Eveland had no idea at the time that he would soon be asked to lead a coup effort on his own.

Premonitions

“The Secretary of State has gone mad!” Miles Copeland, a CIA officer and colleague of Jim Eichelberger, was aghast at John Foster Dulles’ decision to withdraw U.S. financing for Egypt’s Aswan High Dam. Back in Washington, Eveland listened as Copeland relayed that Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein believed Dulles had gravely insulted President Nasser, Arab nationalism, and Egypt itself. Eveland challenged Copeland’s defense of Nasser, questioning both the economic wisdom of the dam and Egypt’s broader expectations that the United States would resolve its regional problems, particularly with Sudan. Copeland insisted the dam was politically essential to Nasser’s prestige and argued that Dulles’ hostility stemmed from Egypt’s recognition of Communist China and its arms purchases from the Soviet bloc.

Copeland asserted that Dulles intended to go further, which would involve aligning the U.S. with British efforts to remove Nasser and changing the leadership on U.S. Middle Eastern policy. Eveland came to understand that a series of personnel changes, which included replacing Ambassador Byroade, sidelining Assistant Secretary George Allen, and installing William Rountree, signaled Dulles’s move to eliminate dissenting voices and assume direct personal control of Middle Eastern policy. “None of this encouraged me,” Eveland recalled.

Upon returning to the Connaught Hotel in London, Eveland found a message from the local CIA station informing him that George Young, the deputy director of MI6, was already on his way to see him. Exhausted, yet determined to report Young’s remarks with complete precision, Eveland suddenly remembered that he was carrying a pocket-sized Grundig wire recorder. Eveland quickly set about discreetly preparing the device to secretly record his conversation with Young. When Young arrived, he sat down in a small armchair in the corner of the room. Eveland positioned himself only a few feet away, sitting on the edge of the bed beneath which his flight bag rested, concealing the activated recorder, which emitted no audible sound. Young began by asserting that Secretary Dulles’ refusal to fund the Aswan Dam had enraged Nasser, making it imperative to bring about a change of government in Syria now, whether or not the United States chose to cooperate. Young explained that the Americans should understand that Britain and Iraq were already mobilizing their Syrian contacts and that a coup would proceed even if it required the full deployment of the Iraqi army. Accusing the Americans of stalling and claiming that Secretary Dulles had approved the plan months earlier, Young berated Eveland for nearly half an hour, apparently intent on ensuring that every word left a lasting impression.

Eveland responded by explaining that he was not a career CIA officer and that his role was limited to evaluating conditions in Syria to ensure that any action there did not alienate the West’s remaining Arab allies. Young burst out laughing. “You’re the key man and you know it,” Young insisted. “Let’s stop playing games and get the job done now!” Eveland took the tape with him to Beirut, where he met with Kim Roosevelt and CIA officer Vern Cassin in Station Chief Ghosn Zogby’s home. Once Eveland described the tape he had of his conversation with Young, Roosevelt reacted with shock, calling it a breach of spycraft and “perfidious.” Unperturbed at the admonishment, Eveland offered to play the recording, but Roosevelt declined: “That won’t be necessary. I’ll inform Allen and Foster of what was discussed in London. Now let’s get on with your work.”

Frustrated at being treated like a messenger, Eveland tried to alert Roosevelt to a developing situation: Iraqi King Faisal II and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were traveling to London, potentially creating an opportunity for an Anglo-Iraqi coup in Syria. Roosevelt said nothing in reply and Eveland left just as other CIA chiefs of station arrived.

Eveland happened to listen to Radio Cairo on July 26, 1956 as Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser spoke of what was to become known as the Suez Crisis. The Suez Canal Company had been largely controlled by British and French shareholders until July 1956; Nasser had now nationalized it. Since Nasser was speaking Egyptian Arabic, Eveland could barely make out a word he was saying to listeners. He had Nasser’s message translated and summarized for him: “One hundred twenty thousand Egyptians, Nasser said, had died building the canal. It belonged to Egypt. Now the canal’s profits would be used to finance the Aswan Dam and the West could choke on its fury.”

First-Time Coup

Arriving in London amid intense political and media hysteria surrounding the Suez Crisis, Eveland watched as U.S. and European officials prepared for international talks while the British press and Parliament framed Egypt’s nationalization of the canal company as an act demanding force. He likened the atmosphere to pre-World War II panic, noting Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s inflammatory rhetoric against Nasser, and felt relief returning to the calmer environment of the Middle East.

Back in Beirut, Eveland learned that similar hysteria was gripping the American press. Journalist Sam Brewer told him that the New York Times was sensationalizing Nasser as a Hitler-like figure and sidelining balanced reporting from correspondents in the region, allegedly due to political and advertiser pressure. Eveland contrasted this with more independent coverage by the Chicago Daily News and observed that U.S. officials and some presidential candidates appeared less alarmist. He concluded that fears of an imminent Arab–Israeli war were exaggerated, although he remained genuinely worried that Britain and France would possibly overreact and provoke conflict with Egypt.

Eveland became involved in a coup d’état plot after failing to secure a Syrian refinery contract for the American firm Procon during a meeting with a minister named Majd ud-Din Jabiri in Damascus. Despite proposing several bidding strategies and even suggesting the refinery be provided free of charge, Eveland was firmly rebuffed. Jabiri explained that Syria has already decided to turn to the Soviet Union, influenced by the U.S. refusal to fund the Aswan Dam and Western pressure on Egypt, which convinced Syrian leaders that American aid carried unacceptable political risks.

Jabiri outlined plans for a low-cost Soviet-supplied refinery to be installed in Homs with free technical support and dismissed Eveland’s warnings about inferior technology. He argued that reliance on the United States would leave Syria vulnerable to economic coercion, especially if it ever nationalized its oil pipelines, and angrily condemned U.S. aid to Israel. The meeting ended with Jabiri’s heated rejection of all American assistance.

Upon returning to Beirut, Eveland cabled a summary of the entire episode to Washington. A week later, he received word that the CIA had decided to back plans for a coup in Syria developed by Michail Bey Ilyan, a prominent Syrian conservative politician and former foreign minister. This plot had been previously outlined by Ilyan to CIA officer Archie Roosevelt, who happened to be Kim’s cousin. Eveland was instructed to obtain the requested funds and deliver them to Ilyan immediately, with orders that the program be put into effect by October 25, 1956. “This message from the CIA’s headquarters was not a request,” Eveland remembered, “it was an order.”

Ilyan had discussed plans for the coup with Eveland and Archie Roosevelt back in July on what happened to be Eveland’s 38th birthday. The plot called for Syrian military forces to seize major cities, secure border crossings, and control radio stations while Colonel Kabbani led armored units in Damascus. Once control was established, a preselected civilian government would be announced. Eveland recalled with embarrassment at how much Ilyan treated the United States’ communiqués and pronouncements with respectful awe: “For these men, America was endowed with power and wisdom. Each word and phrase, they believed, had been carefully thought out, with long-range objectives subtly hidden inside. If they’d only known how many off-the-cuff statements came out of Washington, how many of our officials had to consult maps before discussing the area, their confidence in the West would have been badly shaken.”

Eveland had been on the edge of his seat when he had realized he was listening to coup planning. Ilyan had been asked by Archie if the overthrow of the Syrian government could be accomplished through U.S. funds and assets alone and Ilyan replied: “Ma’aloom.” Both Eveland and Archie knew without the need for translation that this meant “without question.” When Archie had left the meeting, according to Eveland, Ilyan was “smiling like the cat who’d just swallowed the canary.” Now the time had come for Eveland to put the plan into action.

There was first the matter of obtaining half a million Syrian pounds (worth $1.6 million U.S. dollars today) for Michail Ilyan to effectuate the coup. Harvey Armado, head of the Beirut CIA station’s regional finance office, had unrestricted access to Lebanese banks and money changers. He could move vast sums of money without a trace, buying currency at favorable rates and shipping them piecemeal if needed in order to hide the existence of multimillion-dollar transactions, for example. When Eveland requested the funds, Armado asked if he preferred old or new bills and since Eveland was unsure, he suggested a mix of notes from various Syrian banks to avoid leaving a traceable pattern. “Give me two days,” Armado promised, “and I’ll have it for you in a nice suitcase purchased in Damascus. Do you need a receipt when you turn over the money?” Eveland was shocked at the offer: “Hell, no,” he replied. “I’ll pass the damn stuff, but I don’t want a piece of paper with an amount and a name on it. What if I get in trouble?”

There was no CIA manual available to teach Eveland how to transfer money surreptitiously to an agent to overthrow a foreign government. Zogby, the Beirut CIA Chief of Station, simply suggested that he drive the funds to Damascus in the truck of his car. Eveland asked Zogby about how to physically deliver the money to Ilyan in person: “How in hell do I get a heavy suitcase full of money up to my room? The hotel lobby is usually crowded, and the doorman and bellboys fight over my bags the minute I drive up.” Zogby was not of any assistance: “You’ll find a way,” he responded. “After all, didn’t you start out in intelligence work fifteen years ago?” Eveland could not figure out if he meant this remark complimentarily or insultingly.

With the suitcase secured in the trunk of his Ford convertible, Eveland prepared for the border crossing. He opened the suitcase to stare at the stacks of money “with awe” but he decided to not spend the hours it would take to make sure the half a million pounds were all there. He possessed a Syrian identity card tying him to the U.S. Embassy that was supposed to allowed him to bypass full inspections and avoid the need to have his passport stamped. The white card, however, did not carry with it any diplomatic immunity or protection. He decided to cross the Lebanese border into Syria during the daytime and as he traveled through Beqaa Valley on the way to the customs office, he started to become nervous. He could be subject to a full inspection of the contents of his vehicle, which happened on occasion. He would be unable to explain away the vast amount of funds in his truck as being intended for a shopping excursion. Frustrated with his predicament, he cursed “the whole CIA system for depriving me of the protection of a diplomatic passport and the license plates that would immunize my car against inspection—so much for security when I really needed it!” Eveland was now alone in the endeavor to preserve plausible deniability. The personal risk was real; two CIA officers had already been sent to Chinese prisons and would remain there for almost 20 years after they were captured during the Korean War and the U.S. government denied involvement with their work. The best idea Eveland could come up with was to abandon the plan immediately if he was stopped for inspection by Syrian officials and pretend that he forgot his passport in Lebanon, if they allowed him to escape. Distrust of Westerners was stronger at the time in Syria; he would feel relatively safer in Lebanon and he could even call upon their President, Camille Chamoun, to assist him if needed, as they had spoken on several occasions.

As he got closer to the border, his nervousness only increased: he wondered “why in the hell” he was risking his personal freedom to give funds to a man who had no idea they were being delivered to him. He was now in lineup of cars in front of the first border checkpoint; he decided to press on with his mission. As he slowed down, he braced for what may happen to him as he looked up towards the customs inspector. Almost as soon as he braked, the inspector waved him through. He must have stood out, he thought, as he usually had the top rolled down of his convertible in all kinds of weather. Eveland was not out of the woods yet; there was one immigration checkpoint three miles inland in the foothills of the long mountain range bordering Lebanon and Syria. A search of his car could still be made there. He drove up to the checkpoint with bated breath, desperately hoping to avoid arousing any suspicions. He waived his identity card and hoped to avoid the worst as he glanced at the officer with intense trepidation.